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TEACHING FROM THE MARGINS: RACE AS
A PEDAGOGICAL SUB-TEXT
A Critical Essay
REGINALD LEAMON ROBINSON*

Reggie, you can't teach these students the way you were trained
at Penn. These students have special needs, and they are not that
bright.l
You (informal) really don't want to be different. If you're differ
ent, you get in trouble, and I'm not sticking my neck out.
So what you're saying to me is that if I'm different and if I get in
trouble, you're not going to bat for me.
That's right! You're on your own!2
I don't feel that I am learning the property laws and concepts
that I will need to pass the bar, etc. We spend a lot of time dis

* Associate Professor, Howard Law School. B.A., 1981, Howard University;
M.A., 1983, University of Chicago; Exchange Scholar, Departments of Political Science
and Economics, 1984-85, Yale University; J.D., 1989, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D.
Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Summer 1993.
Thanks go to Professor Leonard Baynes of Western New England College School of
Law for founding the Northeastern People of Legal Scholarship Conference and for
inviting me to present this essay; to the Conference Planning Committee for the First
Northeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference; to the editors of the West
ern New England Law Review for agreeing to publish the conference presentations; to
Stephanie Hooks (class of 1997), Marie-Yolaine Bernard (class of 1998), and Felice
Robinson (class of 1998), my research assistants, for their diligence and energy. lowe a
special debt to my partner, Angela Y. Robinson, for her dedication and unswerving
support. Of course, as usual, the politics and errata of this article belong exclusively to
me.
1. I have paraphrased a conversation I had with a liberal, senior white male col
league. Throughout this paper, I describe events which I experienced, and I present
conversations that I had with myoId colleagues. These experiences and conversations
were powerful and marked me indelibly. That notwithstanding, I had to reconstruct not
events but conversations. I also did not wish to use names. I do not wish to indict
anyone personally and professionally. Nevertheless, I want to tell my story. I want to
uncover the brutal experiences, personal indignities, and institutional racism that almost
all minority, women, and gay/lesbian law professors suffer daily. I wish to expose this
maltreatment so that white male (and female) law professors can no longer hide their
shameless, poisonous, and injurious conduct from public scrutiny.
2. Again, a paraphrased conversation I had with a liberal, senior white male col
league as we rushed to a regular faculty meeting.
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cussing philosophers which don't seem to be relevant to the goals
of the students. Much time in class is also spent "arguing" points,
an endeavor which is needed as a lawyering skill but, perhaps,
would be better confined to a class of its own. 3
Prof. Robinson uses a book that spells "Black" with a capital "B"
and "white" with a small "w," which is indicative of his general
attitude of reverse discrimination. White students in this class
are made to feel guilty for the injustices suffered by blacks, while
black students seem to be receiving preferential treatment both
inside and outside class. 4
I feel Professor Robinson is an excellent teacher who receives a .
lot of criticism which I know is based on factors outside of prop
erty. Although we are in 1991, a lot of students just can't accept
a strong positive African American Professor, who is intelligent
and doing things differently. It's sad but true that racism is alive
and well at [our] Law School. 5
INTRODUCfION

In this critical essay, I explore, re-live, and analyze how my
white male colleagues and students marginalized me because they
saw my race in every aspect of my teaching. In this way, white male
professors and students become neutralizing, silencing, and power
ful forces in the life of minority law professors. By racializing any
pedagogical approach, these professors and students had implicitly
decided at least three things. First, my good white colleagues did
not infuse their teaching with a racial perspective. Second, if I
spoke with a racialized voice, then I was a mediocre teacher, and
the students would not pass the bar. Third, I cannot become a ped
agogical force in a majority white legal educational institution. 6 It
. was Kenneth Ferguson who stated that even if minority law profes
sors teach well, in the eyes of their white students they can only be
entitled to average student evaluations. 7 As such, these comple
3. Fall 1991, Student Course Evaluations, Real Property I. The caption of this
page read as follows: "This page is a non-confidential page for comments explaining
your ratings on the previous page, or any other non-confidential comments you would
like to make about the instructor or the course. This page will be available to the
Faculty Personnel Committee for use in decisions affecting the instructor."

4.

Id.
Id.
6. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado
Survey, 24 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 357 (1989); Jennifer M. Russell, On Being Ii
Gorilla in your Midst, or, The Life of One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28
5.

HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 259, 261 (1993).
7. See Professor Kenneth Ferguson, Remarks at the First Mid-Atlantic People of
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mentary forces place us in institutionally marginalized and peda
gogically silenced positions. 8 First, most white students by and
large reject minority law professors as purveyors of any legal
knowledge, especially if our teaching deviates from standard insti
tutional fare, or what one of my colleagues called "a dramatic read
ing of Gilbert's." Second, most white law professors generally fear
that we will disturb their male (on rare occasions female) preroga
tives by proffering a persuasive counter-hegemonic pedagogy.9
Equally important, most liberal white law professors feel particu
larly challenged by a pedagogical (or scholarship) approach that
displaces their positive law or CLS-oriented messages,lO an apColor Legal Scholarship Conference, Howard University School of Law (Feb. 15-17,
1995).
8. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561,566 (1984). Professor Delgado writes:
I think I have discovered a second scholarly tradition. It consists of white
scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars from,
the central areas of civil rights scholarship. The mainstream writers tend to
acknowledge only each other's work. It is even possible that, consciously or
not, they resist entry by minority scholars into the field, perhaps counseling
them, as I was counseled, to establish their reputations in other areas of law. I
believe that this "scholarly tradition" exists mainly in civil rights; nonwhite
scholars in other fields of law seem to confront no such tradition.
Id. at 566 (footnote omitted); see also Margaret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas:
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourses, 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 192 (1994). Montoya states that:
To support their academic progress, Latinos have encouraged their children to
speak English well and have tolerated other aspects of acculturation, such as
changes in friends, clothes and recreational preferences. As they undertake
the daily interactions involved in socialization, students adopt masks of the
dominant culture which manifest the negative values ascribed to traditional
Latinalo culture. Latinalo history is replete with stories about those who
changed their names, lost the Spanish language and with it any trace of a
Spanish accent, or deliberately married out of the culture. In short, some did
whatever was necessary to be seen as not-different by the majority.
[d. at 193.
9. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Differ
ence: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1992) (arguing that
due to larger tenured black law professor presence in legal academe, blacks can intellec
tually share and shape their own agenda, a program that does not immediately react to
white male interest); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea forNarrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2424 (1989) ("Don't get me wrong. They're
a good law school; I could see myself teaching there. But I think they're looking for
someone they will never find - a black who won't challenge them in any way, who is
just like them.").
10. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School·
An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 826-27 (1993) ("But in our exten
sive reading of the storytelling literature, we have found few efforts to connect the
events in the stories with the experiences of white or male readers. Thus, whatever
potential storytelling might have to change attitudes is unlikely to be realized by the
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proach that avoids context and atypical stories. l l
I.

RACIAL UBIQUITy-BLACK OR WHITE?

Can I explain how I feel when I read political philosophy, or
social and legal history, or critical race theory? Traditionally, polit
ical philosophy, although it raises vitally important questions,12 ra
tionalizes our institutional arrangements which argued that race
separates us,D and it proffers a legacy that brings us to racial con
test today.14 In its most elite variety, social and legal history turns
current generation of efforts."); Mark Thshnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Dis
course, 81 GEO. LJ. 251 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra note 10, at 810 ("Even if a story is true, it
may be atypical of real world experiences."). But see Reginald Leamon Robinson,
Race, Myth, and Narrative in the Social Construction of the Black Self, 40 How. L.J.
(forthcoming 1997):
Typicality must stand for something else, and that something must be as much
myth as it is narrative. If it is myth or narrative, then it is constructed, and if
so, then typicality is about whose restrictive lenses matter. On this point, a
minority person's subject positioning is meaningless because Farber and
Sherry believe that people who live in the same communities have the same
experiences.
[d.
12. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru
dence, 24 HARV. L. REv. 591 (1911). Pound states that
[tJhe appeal to reason and to the sense of mankind for the time being as to
what is just and right, which the philosophical jurist is always making, and his
insistence upon what ought to be law as binding law because of its intrinsic
reasonableness, have been the strongest liberalizing forces in legal history.
[d. at 608.
13. See DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CuLTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLIo
TICS OF MEANING 6 (1993) ("Kant, citing with approval David Hume's likening of
learning by 'negroes' to that of parrots, insisted upon the natural stupidity of blacks.
John Stuart Mill, like his father, presupposed nonwhite nations to be uncivilized and so
historically incapable of self-government."). Goldberg wrote that
liberal modernity seems prepared to respond in only of two problematic
forms. The first is to deny otherness, the otherness it has been instrumental in
creating, or at least to deny its relevance. The second seems less extreme, but
the effect is identical. Liberals may admit the other's difference, may be
moved to tolerate it. Yet tolerance ... presupposes that its object is morally
repugnant, that it really needs to be reformed, that is, altered.
[d. at 7; see also GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND:
THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARAGrER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1972). See,
e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 u.S. 537 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. See GOLDBERG, supra note 13, at 113-14.
In undertaking to redress the wrongs of racism, policies of affirmative action
are thought to commit the kind of wrong that they are supposed to be combat
ting, namely, privileging some over others on the basis of racial member
ship.... The objection is usually that the preferential treatment of groups
whose members have been excluded from access to social resources amounts
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on a white person's story about why one race has come to contn;>l
another. 15 And critical race theory explores not only how a radical
liberal civil rights agenda can still ignore the day-to-day lives of mi
nority citizens,16 but also how race has steadily anchored America's
core values. As a "black" person, I read with a racially conditioned
perspective. As a "minority" law professor, I read with a view that
struggles for an authentic place in legal academeP Although I can
not separate my personal self from my professional self, I force a
professional distance. Sometimes, I do sense that I am reacting
emotionally, losing my spiritual center, and cursing between my
clenched teeth. As I read, I seek a teaching agent, so that I can
to unacceptable fonns of reverse racial discrimination against those fonnerly
favored (namely, white males).
Id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Hop
wood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
15. See, e.g., WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTI·
TUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968) (discussing how Anglo-Europeans so
cially conditioned Africans to in part rationalize their decision not only to enslave them
but also to create notions of white superiority); ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF
LYNCHING (1933), reprinted in MASS VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (Robert M. Fogelson &
Richard E. Rubentstein eds., Arno Press & The New York Times 1969). In The Trag
edy of Lynching, Arthur Raper, using the best of intentions, somewhat suggests that if
whites would support blacks through educational opportunities, they would not be sub
ject to racial violence such as lynching. Implicit in this message is that dumb blacks with
few real life chances get viewed as dangerous to poor, middle class, elite whites and
white public officials. However, it also suggests that if liberal institutions worked for
blacks as they potentially work for whites, then racism and white supremacy would not
have a very violent face. See id.; see also HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1980) ("The historian's distortion is more than technical, it is ideo
logical; it is released into a world of contending interests, where any chosen emphasis
supports (whether the historian means to or not) some kind of interest, whether eco
nomic or political or racial or national or sexual. ").
16. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331
(1988). Kimberle Crenshaw wrote:
The failure of the [CLS scholars] to consider race in their account of law
and legitimacy is not a minor oversight: race-consciousness is central not only
to the domination of Blacks, but also to whites' acceptance of the legitimacy of
hierarchy and to their identity with elite interest. Exposing the centrality of
race consciousness is crucial to identifying and delegitimating beliefs that pres
ent hierarchy as inevitable and fair. Moreover, exposing the centrality of race
consciousness shows how the options of Blacks in American society have been
limited, and how the use of rights rhetoric has emancipated Blacks from some
manifestations of racial domination.
Id. at 1369.
17. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Mu
sic: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2129, 2161 (1992).
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deliver critical thinking to my students, an innocular against unre
flective "John Q. or Jane Q. Public" conclusions. As a "black" per
son, I must take them beyond a well-worn story, perhaps a fairy tale
with all white characters,18 so that they can see the kaleidoscope of
human colors-blacks, browns, reds, whites, and yellows 19-and so
that they can hear how, in America, whites unfortunately use
"color" as a proxy for race to determine if people and their voices'
accents have worth.20
Can I explain to my students, colleagues, or deans that my
lived life reeks of an oft-told story of my racial (and thus personal)
irrelevance21 to America's core feature-a white cultural matrix?22
18. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney·Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Obser
vations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
19. See Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immi
gration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425
(1990).
20. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America Accent, Antidiscrimination Law,
and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1329 (1991). Ac
cording to Mari Matsuda:
Every person who reads this Article has an accent. Your accent carries the
story of who you are-who first held you and talked to you when you were a
child, where you have lived, your age, the schools you attended, the languages
you know, your ethnicity, whom you admire, your loyalties, your profession,
your class position: traces of your life and identity are woven into your pro
nunciation, your phrasing, your choice of words. Your self is inseparable from
your accent. Someone who tells you they don't like the way you speak is quite
likely telling you that they don't like you.
Id. at 1329 (footnotes omitted); see also Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the
Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
265 (1990). See, e.g., Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th
CiT. 1994) ("We conclude that Article XXVIII constitutes a prohibited means of pro
moting the English language and affirm the district court's ruling that it violates the
First Amendment."), cert. granted sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
21. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholar
ship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2279 (1992) ("We remain invisible and un
heard in the literature that is the evidentiary database for legal discourse, and when we
are seen, in stories told by others, our images are severely distorted by the lenses of
fear, bias, and misunderstanding."); Robinson, supra note 11; Robin West, Communi
ties, Texts, "and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement, 1 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 129, 138 (1988) ("[Outsiders] do not participate as subjects in the process of
critique and self-transformation .... [B]ecause they are outside the community, they do
not speak; because they do not speak, they are objects ....").
22. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, White Cultural Matrix and the Language of
Nonverbal Advertising in Housing Segregation: Toward an Aggregate Theory of Liabil
ity,25 CAP. U.L. REV. 101 (1996).
To be sure, a white cultural matrix does not stand only for racism and
white supremacy. By racism, society suffers because whites assert that blacks
have immutable traits or genetic predispositions that render them unfit for
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At an ideal level, I prefer to keep this narrative outside my class
room. At a deeper level, where perhaps I am unafraid and centered
in who I really am (i.e., in spirit, an unraced person), I recognize
that I need their racial fear and ignorance. The fear and ignorance
create sincere moments of vulnerability and opportunities for learn
ing. Although my students often aggressively use this fear and ig
norance to wound their peers' ears, hearts, bodies, and minds,23
most students unconsciously express their deep, socially developed
fear of their racialized peers and their experiences. 24 In truth, I face
difficulty whenever I subversively challenge my students' culturally
blinded racism,25 and although I fool myself temporarily into be
lieving otherwise, my words, rhythm, and voice alert my students, as
I enter the class for the first time, that I am only a black man. My
equal access to rights, goods, and services. Under this racist ideology, whites
who have acquired political or economic power set up institutional practices
which limit African Americans' life chances. Under this definition, two exper
iences have been noted. First, I have captured the physical (or symbolic) vio
lence and race hatred of individual racism. Second, I have recognized
institutional racism which operates virtually invisibly, and thus whites establish
rules, norms, and decisionmaking procedures that unduly, impermissibly, and
disproportionately affect African Americans. By white supremacy, I mean a
broad system of white dominance, political power, and cultural hegemony.
Professor Fran Ansley writes:
By white supremacy, ... [sic] [I mean] a political, economic and cultural
system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material re
sources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitle
ment are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white
subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and
social settings.
As such, a white cultural matrix necessarily includes racism and white
supremacy, but it should not be limited to these very powerful aspects of
America's racial oppression. In this way, then, a white cultural matrix not
only provides the germ seed for racism and white dominance, but also a cul
tural hegemony in which every aspect of whiteness as goodness lauds over Af
rican Americans, and in which this whiteness informs every dominant aspect of
American life.
Id. at 122-24 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race,
Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129
(1989)).
23. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In
sults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
24. See generally JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1984);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Anthony Cook, Cultural Racism and the Limits of Rationality in the
Saga of Rodney King, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 297, 297 (1993).
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race thus precedes me as I enter my classroom;26 now they can, in
their minds, justifiably doubt me.27
Alas, I shiver at the thought that I am only a black man. Do I
have a "race"?28 I don't think so! It's all a big joke.29 Although I
recognize that I am spiritual energy in an unqualified, non-linear
moment, the jig's up-my students have seen my "race." Within
moments, I am privatized, murdering and murdered, as their eyes
are fixed on my every move. 30 They doubt, fear, sexualize, and
later, perhaps, respect me. 31 I feel their ambivalence; I dread that
they might feel mine too. No matter what they think of that
"raced" person who just entered the class, I am not him, not solely
a race. But they place me along side those privatized images, pro
jecting them onto the person in front of the class. 32 These projected
26. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race
and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 45.
27. See Okianer Christian Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 HARV. BLACKLETIER J.
21,25 (1993) ("The challenge of the 'You said X' question is the assumption that the
woman law professor can not be more authoritative as a source than the source that the
student is relying upon or quoting from. Unlike the professor, these sources are not
capable of being cross-examined. How does one effectively respond to this special kind
of question without losing or seriously undermining credibility, composure, and general
'coo)'?"); Russell, supra note 6, at 261 ("The blackwoman cannot legitimately claim any
special competence or expertise in any subject or field. Her considered judgments re
garding course coverage, teaching methodology, examination and grading can be chal
lenged with impunity.").
28. See, e.g., Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illu
sion of Race, in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed.,
1986).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1922). The Supreme Court
stated that:
[T]he word "Caucasian" is in scarcely better repute [than the word "Aryan"].
It is at best a conventional term, with an altogether fortuitous origin, which,
under scientific manipulation, has come to include far more than the unscien
tific mind suspects. . . . [I]t includes not only the Hindu but some of the
Polynesians, ... the Hamites of Africa, upon the ground of the Caucasic cast
of their features, though in color they range from brown to black. We venture
to think that the average well informed white American would learn with
some degree of astonishment that the race to which he belongs is made up of
such heterogeneous elements.
Id. at 211.
30. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (refer
ring to the Benneton's case of privatized fear of blacks by whites and the legal cognition
of such fears); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Stereotypes and Evaluative Inter
group Bias, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE PROCESSES IN
GROUP PERCEPTION 167, 179-83 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993)
(discussing the effect of stereotypes on the way in which members of one social group
evaluate people who are not members of that group).
31. See CALVIN HERNTON, SEX AND RACISM IN AMERICA (1988).
32. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
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images limit their visual acuity; they never really see me-just a
stereotype, just a black man. Now, I fight back, looking for an un
mediated space, and I do so by anticipating that I would need a
casebook that places race, gender, class, and an historical context
on its surface.33 I expose them to cases, legal codes, and the arro
gantly marginalizing, legally historical story. And unlike my white
(mostly male) colleagues, I threaten the codes, the story, and I
quickly show them that legal rules have no inherent meaning, no
burning bush. I am unremorseful, telling them that rules operate as
spiritually disempowering blinders; they shield our eyes from the
empty, wrong-headed thinking that undergirds a regime that once
rationalized slavery and currently valorizes racial duality.34 To
them, I am a heretic, an unrepentant thorn in the side of a spiritu
ally corrupt and politically violent story. In the end, I seek an au
thenticity35 that rejects a private language game36 of fear, racism,
ignorance, and deeply unexpressed social guilt. Quietly, I demand
an empowering myth beyond that of a black person and of tradi
tional real property law.
In reaction, my students queue outside of the dean's office. He
listens, silently encouraging them. They complain to my senior
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1258, 1287 (1992).
33. See RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY
(1988).
34. See, e.g., KENNETH O'REILLY, NIXON'S PIANO: PRESIDENTS AND RACIAL
POLITICS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 12 (1995). Kenneth O'Reilly wrote:
Southern strategy in our time remains what it has always been: the gut
organizing principle of American politics. At root it is nothing more than a
belief that presidential elections can be won only by following the doctrines
and rituals of white over black. The pecking order has stayed that way
through the death of slavery and Jim Crow, and notwithstanding Lincoln and
Johnson our presidents have in nearly every other case made it their job to
keep that order.
Id. at 10.
35. See Calmore, supra note 17, at 2169 (discussing authenticity and alienation).
36. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 23, at lIe
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) ("Here the tenn 'language-game' is meant to
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a
of fonn of life."). Ludwig Wittgenstein further argues:
Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's behaviour for
the fact that he does not understand a word: that it means nothing to him, that
he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his 'thinking he understands', [sic]
attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And, lastly, crite
ria for his understanding the word right. In the second case one might speak
of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but
which I 'appear to understand' [sic] might be called a "private language."
Id. § 269, at 94e.
.
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white male colleagues, and after learning how unrepentant I am in
the face of overwhelming hostility to race, gender, and class issues, I
learn that a junior, untenured white female colleague tells one of
my students to inform the Personnel Committee. I feel betrayed
(sometimes I think, "Why betrayed; did I ever trust her?"). None
theless, I press on. I must learn to teach, to subvert, to enlighten. 37
Am I committing professional suicide? My students demand only
rules, and my colleagues require sworn allegiance to a "high
school" pedagogy that justifies their institutional standing and per
sonal privileges. I am told emphatically to teach like all others. 38
Give them the black letter law (I think a touch of irony); they, after
all, cannot handle a challenging pedagogy and must feel that they
can pass the bar.
I reject both calls. 39 Because each of us accepts a range of so
cial norms as true, we have, regardless of race, common exper
iences. However, as individuals, we experience a host of events
differently.40 This difference will affect the manner in which we
teach.41 Then I cannot teach like my white colleagues because I am
See Dark, supra note 27. As Dark explains:
Many teachers have problems in their early careers managing the time of
the class so that they can accomplish their goals. These teaching goals may
include the introduction of and development of the traditional legal tools
otherwise referred to as the process-the lawyering process; coverage of a dis
crete body of law known as _ X _; and any other goals that the professor
deems important in her course.
[d. at 23.
38. Summarizing and paraphrasing a conversation I had with a colleague on the
Personnel Committee.
39. See Calmore, supra note 17, at 2160 (stating that critical race theory does not
care about all institutional concerns).
40. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman
Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46 (1990-91).
[W]e tend to think that only Black men's lives are dominated by the experi
ence of "being feared." But in this instance [i.e., two white women on differ
ent floors refusing to enter an elevator with all black women in their 30s and
408], by virtue of color alone, we too were feared. Thus being feared is not
simply a Black male experience, it is part of the Black experience.
Id. at 50.
41. See Lawrence, supra note 21.
The Word, in stark contrast [to the objective, unbiased, and universal perspec
tive], embraces positioned perspective. It recognizes the impossibility of dis
tance and impartiality in the observation of a play in which the observers must
also be actors. But, championing subjectivity is more than an acknowledg
ment of the existence and validity of many different and competing perspec
tives. Practitioners of the Word must learn to privilege their own perspectives
and those of other outsiders, understanding that the dominant legal discourse
is premised upon the claim to knowledge of objective truths and the existence
37.
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not like them. Despite this obvious existential point, I do get the
picture: teach without a (racial?) perspective. 42
Basically, I was invited to join the faculty because I had
"black" skin, and I could stay as long as I taught in a "white" face.
To adopt any suggestion means that these students cannot blend
critical thinking and the lawyering process. It would mean that my
colleagues do not take their mission seriously. It would mean that I
doubt my students. (On several occasions, students would ask me if
my colleagues thought they were too stupid. I answer honestly:
"Some ... yes, but I believe in you. That's why I don't spoon-feed
you."). And it would mean that I am knowingly participating in
marginalizing my personal-professional voice. Within one year af
ter I entered legal academe, I am all too painfully aware that race
black and white-operates as sub-text, no matter how I teach.
II.

THE BLACK LAW PROFESSOR:

A

(THE)

QUESTIONABLE INTELLECfUAL?

Since 1991, I have learned that effective law teaching locates
itself in a high conspiracy of excellence and commitment. As
Taunya Lovell Banks argues, "[g]ood law teachers are intellectually
challenging and aggressively involved with students."43 Excellence,
commitment, .challenge, and aggression serve as key ingredients,
which originate with a law school's faculty. And these ingredients
alchemically change students and teachers alike. I do not present
an ideal; I would imagine that all law schools would confess their
role in this conspiracy. They would publicly declare it. Cynically,
as long as deans and law faculty playa role in defining what excel
lence, commitment, challenge, and aggression mean, all law schools
have good law teachers, especially if their definition does not dis
turb the dominant institutional narrative. 44
of neutral principles. We must free ourselves from the mystification produced
by this ideology.
Id. at 2252-53 (footnotes omitted).
42. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward A Race-Conscious
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REv. L & WOMEN'S STUD. 33, 46 (1994) (dis
cussing perspectivelessness as dominant discourse).
43. Banks, supra note 40, at 46.
44. Cf Dark, supra note 27, at 29.
Did they think we were only having some purely academic discussion about
First Amendment rights and self-determination [when I voiced concern over
the "Buckwheat skit" incident]? Why couldn't they see that this was a discus
sion about this institution's values, this institution's commitment to fairness,
justice and sensitivity regarding all members of the community, not just those
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However, good law teaching is a narrative, a story, that reflects
a certain perspective, usually an institutional one driven by a host of
well-formed cultural norms, and it continues to reject the black law
professors-the questionable intellectua1. 45 As such, I understand
these ingredients (e.g., excellence, commitment, challenge, and ag
gression) in this narrative context. They are text and sub text. At
the level of text, everyone can be good law teachers, and in this
vein, law schools actively recruit minorities and women for this
role.46 At the level of subtext, minorities and women are not ex
pected by white males (deans and professors) to succeed in the
classroom. If a minority succeeds in the classroom, especially in a
majority white institution, she must leave most of her lived exper
iences in her diary, in her close personal friend's ears, or in her law
review article's "fictional" personal narratives. 47 If a minority fails
in the classroom, he must have violated an institutional norm, some
totem to which most of the white males pray and upon which most
white law students depend to gauge their performance in law
schoo1. 48 In either case, success or failure depends on whether the
who represent the dominant culture. Faculty maintain and translate the insti
tutional norms, ethos, values.
Id.

45. See Delgado, supra note 9.
[O]ne [younger law professor] even changed the subject and asked about my
philosophy of teaching. That brought everybody to the edge of their chairs. I
got the impression many of them merely wanted assurance that I would write
some articles, even if they were mediocre. But they were all extremely con
cerned that I be a good teacher. I think many of them were looking for a
mascot, not a fellow scholar-someone who would counsel and keep the stu
dents in line, not someone who could challenge his or her colleagues at their
own game.
Id. at 2423.
46. See Retaining Faculty oiColor, 3 AALS NEWSL. (Ass'n of Am. L. Sch., Wash
ington, D.C.), Aug. 1996, at l.
The good news is that the number of new minority law professors increased
during the 1995-96 academic year, as it did during the previous year. The bad
news, however, is that the number of minority faculty leaving law teaching also
increased. Although 62 members of racial minorities became law professors
during the 1995-96 academic year, 31 minority professors left. During the
1994-95 academic year, 46 members of racial minorities became law profes
sors, but 22 minority professors left.
Id. at 7.
47. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 30.
48. In a 1991-1992 student evaluation, one of my students wrote:
Prof. Robinson may be very knowledgeable about the subject of real property,
but he certainly does not know how to teach it. I can't even say that he
doesn't know how to explain property concepts because he doesn't attempt to
explain. His understanding of teaching is to assign the readings, then to con
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minority law professor locates herself inside or outside of the insti
tution's narrative. This narrative does not empower, but restricts,
one's pedagogy,49 and in so doing, it usually shelters white male law
professors from the reality that they violently, institutionally, and
continuously marginalize minority law professors. This narrative
also prevents a minority law professor from naming her own per
sonal and professional reality, 50 an experience in which she has
probably suffered the ugly face of invisible white privilege. 51 With
out institutional power and naming rights, this narrative reifies a
cultural norm that denies that minority law professors on their own
terms can succeed in the classroom and that rejects the black intel
duct an extreme Socratic method in class, which leaves students with more
questions hanging unanswered than with answers, and with more questions
after class than they had before class.
Another student wrote: "This instructor gives students the benefit of the doubt that
they are bright enough to handle various techniques to teaching a given subject, instead
of feeling that students can only handle 'spoon feeding' of the black letter law."
49. Cf Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984). Fish aptly argues
that:
My contention is that by showing why the good kind of independence can
never be achieved, I have shown at the same time why the bad kind is never a
possibility. Just as rules can be read only in the context of the practice they
supposedly order, so are those who have learned to read them constrained by
the assumptions and categories of understanding embodied in that same prac
tice. It is these assumptions and categories that have been internalized in the
course of training, a process at the end of which the trainee is not only pos
sessed of but possessed by a knowledge of the ropes, by a tacit knowledge that
tells him not so much what to do, but already has him doing it as a condition of
perception and even of thought. The person who looks about and sees, with
out reflection, a field already organized by problems, impending decisions,
possible courses of action, goals, consequences, desiderata, etc. is not free to
choose or originate his own meanings, because a set of meanings has, in a
sense, already chosen him and is working itself out in the actions of percep
tion, interpretation, judgment, etc. he is even now performing.
Id. at 1333.
50. See Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter? ,
76 VA. L. REv. 95 (1990). Richard Delgado argues that the socialized "Other" has a
right to name his or her own reality. In this regard, critical race theory asserts:
(1) an insistence on "naming our own reality;" (2) the belief that knowledge
and ideas are powerful; (3) a readiness to question basic premises of moder
ate/incremental civil rights law; (4) the borrowing of insights from social sci
ence on race and racism; (5) critical examination of the myths and stories
powerful groups use to justify racial subordination; (6) a more contextualized
treatment of doctrine; (7) criticism of liberal legalisms; and (8) an interest in
structural determinism-the ways in which legal tools and thought-structures
can impede law reform.
Id. at 95 nJ.
51. See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Ac
count of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies, in LESLIE
BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW 22 (1995).
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lectual as a co-equal partner in the legal academic enterprise. 52
Equally important, this narrative of good law teaching rejects
minority law professors as intellectual equals. 53 In his Notes on Vir
ginia, did not Thomas Jefferson question the intellectual abilities of
black Africans?54 Due to Americans' commitment to a white cul
tural matrix, white male law professors have defined the parameters
of good law teaching in a manner which reifies their values, morals,
and standards, and which questions implicitly, sometimes explicitly,
the intellectual acumen of minority law professors. This narrative
mandates that minority law professors present the law as they
would. However, this view does not account for the whole medi
ated experience that a minority law professor brings with her. Je
rome McCristal Culp writes:
All black law professors face a common problem. We are asked
to playa role that is assigned to us because of our race, and we
then are asked to remove our blackness when we play the role.
This role is to be black and to be a law professor without retain
ing any visible signs of our black experience. Our colleagues
would like us to take care of black students, mother white stu
dents, and perform numerous tasks associated with being profes
sors. Not all of us are ready or able to play all of the roles that
our status as black representatives in a largely white profession
thrust on us. We not only rebel, we try to reshape the role ....
[W]e bring the voice of our own experience to the ... teaching
that we perform. . . . We sometimes see the world exactly as
other Americans see it and sometimes not, but we always bring
that dual experience that is both similar to and different from the
experience of white law professors to the jobs we perform as
professors. 55

In 1991, I implicitly challenged the narrative by which white
male law professors gauged their classroom success when I un
52.

See Richard Delgado, Approach-Avoidance in Law School Hiring: Is the Law

a WASP?, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631 (1990). "Liberal law faculty members both want,
and fear, minorities and women. They realize they should have more of us, and would
like to welcome us into the fold. But at the same time they fear us, and want us to keep
our distance. We are unsettling - we are Other." Id. at 634.
53. Banks, supra note 40, at 46-47 (Stating that "the need for Black women men
tors/intellectuals is a better justification for hiring Black women as law teachers than is
the need for role models. Law faculties may not take this argument seriously because
of the societal bias against all women (and Black men) as intellectuals and leaders.").
54. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1781), reprinted in
STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 116, 121-24 (3d ed. 1995).
55. Culp, supra note 26, at 45 (footnote omitted).
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knowingly questioned my institution's pedagogical model. It was
called derisively the "High School Model." It is a dressed up ver
sion-with all of the thrill and excitement of watching two slugs
race-of spoon feeding. 56 When I interviewed with this institution,
I had no idea that its pedagogical movement had been entombed
years before I arrived. Although I later learned that junior col
leagues grumbled under their powerless breaths, no one knowingly
challenged it, and on the few occasions when a young white feminist
began to express herself openly, students complained, calling her a
man-hater. The dean, always adverse to students' complaints be
cause the law school is tuition driven, listened and encouraged
them. Shortly thereafter, the Personnel Committee sternly chas
tised her, and quietly encouraged her to think not of intellectual
interests but of contract renewal. She quickly folded her intellec
tual tent, operating instead inside the institutional narrative of good
law teaching. Like this young, female colleague, I used my voice, a
point of view molded by my needlessly race-oriented experiences.
Like this colleague, I wanted to do more than pour meaningless
rules and principles into my students' heads without a social, histor
ical, and philosophical context. I was, after all, not Emanuel's per
sonified but a law professor. Unlike this colleague, I, having newly
arrived, did not know of the privileged position the "High School"
model enjoyed. I did not know that this model made the white
male law professors institutional gods, and I did not know that it
was the only model in town. By the time I caught on, the horse had
left the burning barn.
I entered legal academe, perhaps foolishly, but no less idealisti
cally, believing that after I introduced my students to fundamental
concepts in property law, I was free to graze the intellectual pas
ture, so that I could invite them, often against their will, to question,
doubt, or subvert deeply held convictions about the law and their
role in making the law live positively in the lives of their clients and
society.57 As Oliver Wendell Holmes persuasively argued, the law
56. In 1991 a student wrote:
A different method than the majority of other professors seemingly always
produces a negativity among students. However, I believe this instructor's de
mand that all students be extremely prepared angered only those students who
feel they have no responsibility to work hard. In other words, my guess is that
the majority of this class is lazy and are more apt to complain than to work
hard. This instructor will be one of the premier professors whose demand for
hard work is renown.
57. In a 1991 student evaluation, one student wrote:
Prof. Robinson is a warm, cheerful, and sensitive person. Unfortunately, in a
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is not logic but experience. 58 In part, this experience begins with
social and legal theorists. I therefore assigned edited material from
such authors as Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, Sir William Black
stone, Jeremy Bentham, Georg W.F. Hegel, Sir Henry Maine, Karl
Marx and Frederick Engels, Harold Demsetz, and Charles Reich,59
as well as Immanuel Kant,60 Wesley Hohfeld,61 and Richard Pos
ner.62 To this list of flaming subversives, I added a liberal response
to Marx and Engels. 63 In the American context, this experience
also includes Native Americans, black Americans, white Ameri
cans, Hispanics, Asians, women, the poor, and the wealthy. I used
Richard Chused's casebook on Property Law, which advances a
Law and Society approach. 64 I chose this book precisely because it
self-consciously focused on race, gender, class, and privilege. In this
way, my students would not only get a healthy dose of rules, princi
ples, and standards, but also a unique American context out of
classroom setting, he believes he knows how to teach, and that is yet to be
proven. He brings in outside reading that would be helpful in a history of law
class or a philosophy of law class, but not in real property. I would like some
one from the faculty [to] ask Prof. Robinson what in the world he tried to
accomplish by having us read Immanuel Kant in a real property law class. This
is not undergrad "205" philosophy! This is a class that is supposed to have a
professor that is patient and sensitive to the class's knowledge. Not one where
the professor just assigns readings and then spends the whole class on portions
of the reading, giving us hypotheticals on the moral character of the litigants.
Another student wrote:
I recognize that this professor is receiving a great deal of criticism. I support
this teaching and have respected his accessibility. [I] appreciate [the] quality
of the teaching assistants. He's challenged, even demanded the class to rise to
the occasion-this has personally motivated me to do better. Plus, this profes
sor has supported ethics which will always influence me.
58. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1991) ("The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
59. See CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION passim (3d ed. 1993).
60. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck
trans., 1980). After my first year of teaching Property, I decided to drop Kant's reading
from my course, primarily because the students' negative reaction and my colleagues'
lack of support were so strong.
61. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.2 (1984)
(citing WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23-124
(1923)).
62. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 2.1, at 10-13 (1972)
(discussing private and public incentives to use resources efficiently by a criteria, viz.,
universality of ownership, exclusivity of ownership, and transferability of property
rights).
63. These authors included Baechler and Chapman. See DONAHUE ET AL., supra
note 59, at 177-79.
64. See CHUSED, supra note 33.
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which to learn Property Law. With this approach, we could think
and rethink rules, principles, and standards. 65
For example, teaching Johnson v. M'Intosh,66 Dred Scott v.
Sandford,67 and Brummet v. Weaver,68 offered me, and the students,
excellent opportunities to think and rethink rules, principles, and
standards. The social and legal theorists, having already been dis
cussed, would give them a conceptual framework from which to
question thoroughly the legitimacy of an existing rule. In Johnson,
we had an opportunity to think and rethink, at the very least, about
legal norms as racial narratives, "first in time" as political pragma
tism, dominant discourse as "perspectivelessness,"69 the discovery
rule as imperial rule making, or chain of title as politically sanc
tioned possession. In Dred Scott, we could, at the very least, ac
knowledge that procedure informs substantive justice, rights-based
discourses (e.g., property regimes) depend not on legal standards
but on rationalized alienation,70 and federal citizenship (e.g., immi
gration policy) reflects racial fears and interest convergence. 71 And
65. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the
Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1990).
If we think of law only as a set of rules or principles, the social sciences have
little to offer legal studies. Accordingly, if law is to be examined by the social
sciences, it has to be redefined. We have to think of law as a social institution,
as interacting behaviors, as ritual and symbol, as a reflection of interest group
politics, as a fonn of behavior modification, or in some other way that makes it
amenable to social scientific analysis.
Id. at 6.
66. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
67. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
68. 2 Or. 168 (1866).
69. See Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 35.
70. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the
Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563, 1567 (1984) ("Alienation ... is a
paradoxical fonn of reciprocity between two beings who desire authentic contact with
each other and yet at the same time deny this very desire in the way that they act
toward one another."). Peter Gabel correctly argues that:
For those of us gathered within the geographical borders of the United
States, the verbal concepts that purport to constitute our group in this fashion
are contained in "the Constitution," which signifies both an original moment
in which we supposedly came together to fonn "a union," and the schema by
which we are to reproduce our group connection through the reproduction of
"the State," and through "the following of laws" created and interpreted by
this "State." These laws define how we are "allowed to act" in the fonn of
"rights." If we now examine the relationship of this schema to the inner expe
rience of the alienated individual that I have just summarized, we can discover
how the schema is intended to "legalize" this experience and in so doing make
the reproduction of alienation a condition of group membership.
Id. at 1573-74 (footnotes omitted).
71. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the
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with Dred Scott, we should not only discuss the life tenant's right to
encroach on the eventual taker's vested remainder,72 but also ask: If
the state determines what is "property," then should humans ever
be property?73 I could also ask them to consider Dred Scott and
Florida v. Powell,74 and ask: Should we avoid creating property re
gimes that might commodify human beings?75 If the answer is "yes,
of course," then should we permit people to have a commercial
right in their images?76 In Brummet, we could not only discuss the
notice rule for bona fide purchasers, but also chance thinking and
rethinking creditors' rights as gender marginalization, a women's
right to control their personal and real property, and the role of
courts and legislators in reinvigorating aspects of patriarchal con
trol. In using cases like Johnson, Dred Scott, and Brummet, I had a
very narrow goal: to question the sanctity of legal rules and princi
ples. I confess also a larger, general goal: to challenge. all social
regimes and institutions. These goals compliment each other-trust
not what you are told, but what you learn by experiences to be
"true." Why? At base, law, rules, concepts, and institutions repre
sent ideas in flux, and each of us has a moral obligation to move
them toward "True Justice." In effect, I ushered my students into
Hegelian dialectics.17 For those students who believed the law
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980); Kevin R. Johnson, Los
Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration
Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139.
72. See CHUSED, supra note 33, at 163 ("Emerson died in 1843, leaving all his
property to his wife for her life, with the remainder to his daughter, Henrietta Sanford
Emerson. The will also gave Mrs. Emerson the power to encroach upon the interest of
the remainder to provide for her own maintenance or for the education of Henrietta."
(footnotes omitted)) (citing WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS: DRED
SCOTT'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 28 (1979)).
73. In a 1991 student evaluation, one student wrote: "This was supposed to be a
Real Property class; thus far we have wasted our money. We have been insulted by Mr.
Robinson's decision that, as a class, we have had no moral education. The teacher
actually made us read Kant before he would discuss the Dred Scott decision."
74. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
75. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849
(1987); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
76. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (creating a right of publicity that survives the
death of the holder and descends to heirs, even if the holder fails to exploit that right
during his or her life).
77. See J.N. Findlay, The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel, in HEGEL: A COL·
LECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 17 (Alasdair MaCIntyre ed., University of Notre Dame
Press 1976). Findlay states:
I think there are several strong grounds for being an Hegelian . . . . One
should be an Hegelian because, as a rational being, one must be one anyway,
because one must at least act as if all theoretical discrepancies could be re
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could promote justice, I was deeply appreciated and valued. 78 For
those students who believed that property should only prepare
them to pass the bar examination, I was doubted, vilified, and
rejected. 79
Basically, when my students and my colleagues criticized me,
they implied that I did not fit within the institutional narrative of
good law teaching, and that they could not respect me as a black
intellectual. First, the students who had been socialized in the insti
tutional discourse on good law teaching imposed upon me the sole
obligation to manipulate the "black letter law." One student wrote
on a non-confidential page in my evaluations:
Professor Robinson is a very nice man on a one to one basis.
However, this semester in Real Property has caused a great deal
of discomfort in myself and other students, for the following rea
sons: ... He has not taught us black letter law which will place his
students at a serious disadvantage on the Bar exam.
This student also wrote that I "[f]ocuse[d] on civil rights over real
property." Another student wrote: "Waste of [money] thus far.
The teaching approach taken does not mesh with the make-up of
the class." Yet another student wrote:
I have always been a student who gives the professor the benefit
of the doubt. Professor Robinson is an extremely nice individual
and is a pleasure to converse with outside of class. I only wish
the best for him, but I do have great doubts about his teaching
moved, all irrational impulses controlled, all differences of personal insight
and interest adjusted, the natural world deprived of its alienation and
remoulded to serve the rational purposes of man.
Id. at 18-19.
78. For example, one student wrote:
This one is a keeper in light of [the law school's] difficulty in acquiring an
adequate minority Real Property instructor. His level of preparation is ex
tremely high. As a result, students must struggle to match his expectations.
Although the subject matter of the course differed from other professors, per
haps what we learned may prove more valuable/useful in the long run.
79. In 1991 a student wrote:
I took this class in order to learn about real property. I am paying this school
about $1,200 and I have only learned philosophy. I cannot stand before a
judge, or a .client, and tell them what Locke or Bentham would think about
their situation. That would be the end of my career. If [this law school] wants
to improve their bar-passing rate to somewhere above its 50%, I would sug
gest that you get professors who teach the law and who would help students to
learn enough to pass that section. Obviously, this class will not benefit any of
us. Fortunately, we take a bar-passing course which is my only salvation from
this class. Screen your hires more thoroughly. Robinson would be better
teaching philosophy. BAG HIM!!
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ability. Whether or not he should teach about philosophers in a
property class is not the issue, what is im issue is that he does not
teach the law of property. He has never once laid down a rule or
explained a definition, and we are required to learn the "black
letter" law through supplemental sources. (We might as well
have taken a "write in" correspondence course.) He seems to
hold us to a higher standard, which is good, but his neglect of
instruction, his bias in class, and his unnecessary waste of valua
ble class time has worn completely thin. If he would ever get off
his "high horse," he might be an average Professor at best. A.
change is NEEDED!

The pain I experienced in teaching Real Property was ampli
fied when I read these student evaluations (I had yet to meet the
late Trina Grillo who told us how to cope with student evaluation's
hatred). I did not know how to respond. I did not know to whom I
could turn. I had friends across the country, but none of them
could help solve this institution's peculiarity. As Jerome Culp al
ways reminds us: "all politics is local." At the time, I thought that
my students had plenty of rules. In fact, at different points in the
semester, I gave them the rules; what matters is not rules but analy
sis.80 I then reali?ed that "black letter law" was both literal and
metaphoric. It meant more than getting the rules. On a literal
level, it means: first, that the teacher is not stating clearly what are
the rules and holdings; second, that the teacher is not targeting rule
analysis to the bar examination; and third, that the teacher is not
telling them how to desegregate rules for analytical approaches.
On a metaphorical level, however, it means: first, that students are
getting a perspective that challenges the dominant discourse (thUS,
fear, anger, or guilt might arise);81 second, that students are receiv
ing policy analysis that questions the court's rationale (e.g., destabi
lizing and revealing a court's racial, gender, or class bias); and third,
that the students are suffering through an intellectual discourse only
minimally relevant to traditional law school pedagogy (e.g., profes
sor always teaches not property but philosophy). As such, when
students criticize professors, especially minorities and women, com
plaining to deans or personnel committees that they are not getting
80. See Fish, supra note 49, at 1326 ("[I]f the rules tell you what to do with texts,
they cannot themselves be texts, but must be-in the strong sense assumed by an older
historiography-documents. Unfortunately, rules are texts. They are in need of inter
pretation and cannot themselves serve as constraints on interpretation." (footnote
omitted)).
81. See generally ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH (1992).
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the "black letter law," they seek to control those professors who
imagine themselves not as trade school lecturers but as true intel
lectuals. In this way, student evaluations serve many purposes, the
least of which is constraining the black intellectual.
In addition, "civil rights" and "make-up of the class" serve as
proxies (or metaphors) for race, and a so-called "black" intellectual
pursues not an institutional agenda but a personal one. 82 I chose
Chused's property textbook83 because I did not wish to supplement
my casebook with "my" materials, an approach that invariably
raises charges from students that professors are not meeting the stu
dents' narrow pedagogical needs.84 If "civil rights" and "make-up"
conjoin to reveal a racist undertone or to mark black intellectuals as
irrelevant, then it would appear that the students' expectations have
clashed with the cases on which I have relied to teach critical, ana
lytical thinking. 85 For example, I still think that Shelley v.
Kramer,86 Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Bar
ringer,87 and Evans v. Abney88 are excellent cases not only to teach
traditional concepts in real property law (e.g., racially restrictive
covenants; public charitable trust and contingent remainders; and
fee simple determinables, grantor's intent, and court's equitable
82.
83.

See Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 49-52.
See CHUSED, supra note 33.

84. In my 1991 student evaluations, one of my students wrote:
We are badgered about the facts leading up to the case and the procedural
history and spend little, if any time on the property concepts. . .. This profes
sor spends 90% of the class time trying to build adversarial skills in a handful
of individuals at the expense of the education of the others. He is not color
blind at all .... If you're a white male in this class you won't have to worry
about being called on. The only students we know by name are a few blacks
he constantly harps on (Isaac and O'Neil) and one female (Tiffany). The book
isn't colorblind either so most of the discussions are very black/white or male/
female or one culture or another oriented. It seems as if furthering his own
policy/political considerations are more important than teaching property.
85. In my 1991 student evaluations, one of my students wrote:
I think many were confused at first with where we were going with the mate
rial and Prof. Robinson's approach. However, I believe that the course has
greatly improved from the beginning. Prof. Robinson's classroom method has
a strong focus on legal analysis, and has caused us now to focus in depth on the
material, and really think about [it]. Prof. Robinson appears to have gained
greater sensitivity to the class needs, and I believe that overall this will be
come a valuable experience. Prof. Robinson shows potential to be an excel
lent Professor of Law. I'm not sure about the text ... too many non-property
issues have been left unedited, but this may be intentional?
86. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
87. 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955).
88. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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powers), but also· to discuss the injustice, inefficiency, and insanity
of white supremacy.89 For students, the former information (e.g.,
contingent remainders) is relevant, but the context out of which it
arises, and in no small measure the manner in which I question
them on the courts' logic and reasoning, cause them to doubt the
viability of their own race-oriented thinking. It is perhaps their
point-that if they can get this so-called black intellectual to drop
the racial context, then they can keep their "John or Jane Q."
thoughts about race, gender, class, and sexual orientation issues and
simply learn the technical tool of legal reasoning. If true, as one
student put it, then I "might be an average professor at best." As
such, one of my students had implicitly stated that I cannot be a
"black" intellectual if my white colleagues cannot imagine it and if
my students refuse to accept it.90
To the extent that student evaluation codes (e.g., "black letter
law" or "civil rights") alerted the dean and my colleagues that
something amiss was occurring in my Real Property course, the
Personnel Committee served to reinforce the institution's narrative
of good law teaching. Keep in mind that I take issue with my stu
dents; however, students take their lead from their professors and
from the institution's administrators (e.g., deans). Thus, when my
students write on non-confidential forms, which clearly indicate
that the Personnel Committee will use their information "in deci
sions affecting the instructor," and when my colleague uses his
classroom time to genenite doubt, hostility, and disrespect for my
pedagogical goals, I become deeply concerned when the Personnel
Committee implicitly asserts that its goal is to ensure conformity to
the institution's narrative of good law teaching. 91
89. See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS
(1995).
90. At the beginning of my second year of teaching, one of my students carne to
my office to discuss his grade and overall performance. I asked why he had performed
poorly in my class but had done very well in other classes. He told me that he had been
angry with me for the entire year. I asked why. He honestly stated that when he first
encountered me, he realized that I was everything he wanted to be, and because of the
way I performed, he also realized that he could never be as good as me. I was surprised
by his candor, and I began to understand that when minorities, women, gays, and lesbi
ans stand in front of the classroom, usually before white students who have never ex
perienced us as institutional authorities or as intellectual role models, they react on
many unseen but expressed levels, one of which is anger and jealousy. In part, the
result can be hostility and violence. I mention these responses because they can affect
negatively how minority professors succeed in the classroom and because they can de
termine if such professors stay within legal academe.
91. For example, during my Spring semester, 1993, the Personnel Committee
carne to my class for approximately three weeks. Most members visited at least twice.
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Consider the following example where the Personnel Commit
tee did not protect me from a senior, tenured member of the
faculty. I would argue that, among other things, it did not go to
great lengths to protect me because, perhaps at the very least, it
concluded that I had created my difficulty by violating the institu
tional narrative of good law teaching. In the Spring semester of
1992, one of my students, who happened to be white, told me that I
ought to be concerned about one of my colleagues. This professor
and I taught the same students. He taught civil procedure. He was
tenured and a full professor, and at that time he had been teaching
at the institution since 1983. At this point, the Personnel Commit
tee was considering me for contract renewal, and the student be
lieved that this professor would work against my retention.
According to this student, the professor would ridicule me and my
pedagogy to our mutual students. They would laugh. These jokes
confirmed in the minds of my students that I had adopted a peda
gogical approach that was unsupported by the dean, the faculty, and
the institution. Apparently, this professor told jokes about me and
my teaching approach every time the class met. I asked another
student, who happened to be black and with whom I had become
somewhat close, if my colleague told jokes about me in a manner
that derided my efforts. He said "yes." I asked him if the jokes
were funny, and he said "yes." I asked him if he and other students
laughed, and he again said "yes." As I understand it, on one occa
sion, this professor, while discussing a particular principle of civil
procedure, began to discuss the rule against perpetuities (a subject
we had not yet reached). According to the story, he stopped ab
ruptly and apologized, stating: "Oh, I forgot you're learning philos
ophy not property." At this remark, the students all laughed.
After I learned that this professor was purposefully undermin
ing my credibility in the classroom, I spoke with two colleagues
At one point, one of my students asked me if something were wrong with my class. As
he explained it, the Personnel Committee had come once to one of his other classes. It
is clear that some of my students began to read the constant visits as a signal that maybe
I was doing something that my colleagues were not doing. I gave the student an innocu
ous answer. I did not have the heart to say that my colleagues don't respect me and feel
that I have no right to educate my students. I felt a sense of shame, diffidence, and
anger. From this brief conversation, I began to understand that the Committee was
treating me differently from other junior faculty, and at the same time, if they had
concerns, none of them were coming to me or talking with me. Thereafter, I became
hyper-aware whenever I entered my class because I did not know how I would manage
my class if my students perceived that I was institutionally endangered, and thus they
could rightly doubt what I said, the questions I asked, and the materials they had to
read.

174

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:151

(one male (senior) and one female Gunior)) who served on the Per
sonnel Committee. These professors constituted a subcommittee of
the Personnel Committee, and they were charged with "assisting"
me. I told them what I had learned about my colleague, and stated
that I did not want him to apologize to me because I did not think
that he would or that they would demand that he should. I simply
wanted him to stop. Approximately two weeks later, I was told by
the senior male on the subcommittee that they had spoken with him
and that he had agreed to stop. Within two weeks, I learned from
my students that he never stopped, and that he ridiculed me with
increased vigor after he had met with the subcommittee. I felt help
less, professionally undermined, and institutionally marginalized.
Later, I learned that at the discussion which concerned my reten
tion, this professor harangued against me and my pedagogy. He
told stories which my students had allegedly told him. He never
mentioned that he had encouraged my students to reject me as both
their law professor and as a black intellectual. He apparently had
hoped to turn the faculty against me. I was told what happened at
the meeting by a sympathetic colleague (the only other minority on
the faculty); the Personnel Committee never informed the full
faculty that this professor actively undermined me. Despite his as
sault on my personal integrity and professional character in an open
faculty meeting-or maybe because he had done it-the faculty, by
some unknown majority, voted to retain me for one additional year.
At the beginning of the Spring semester, 1992, before this vote
was taken, I met with two colleagues on my Personnel subcommit
tee. It would appear that they had read my student evaluations,
and that they were determined to steer me away from my pedagogi
cal approach. Throughout the meeting, I felt not like a colleague
but like an errant employee who was getting reprimanded by a boss
or supervisor. We did not sit in a circle, where I could feel as if we
were engaged in the enterprise of helping me, a new law teacher,
learn how to teach effectively and how to attain the goals of my
pedagogical philosophy. I felt like my colleagues were adversaries.
In effect, this subcommittee was perhaps mandated to whip the ini
tiate into line. In this meeting, we did not talk about my teaching
philosophy, what I expected of my students, why I demanded their
excellence, or how my demand for excellence is less about perfect
performance on an examination and more about learning to do
what they might initially consider improbable. Rather, I felt like I
was getting an early warning which a litigation-conscious employer
could then place in the worker's personnel file so that, at the ap
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pointed hour, when it must dismiss him, it could operate with a
clean conscience-after all, the subcommittee intimated that this
event could happen. Minorities have never succeeded at this insti
tution; and by success I mean earned tenure. Perhaps, as a conse
quence of this fact, this institution believed not that I would
succeed, but that I would fail. In this way, this meeting was a brick
in the wall of a self-fulfilling prophesy.92
When I entered my colleague's office, I was already deeply in
pain. It was a very rough beginning. I was battle weary, bone tired.
And when he began to talk, I sank into my pain which embraced
me with rough, razor sharp arms. As he talked, I sensed that invisi
ble cuts would hasten my death. I wondered if he saw my pain. He
did not. As he continued to talk, I felt small and unsure. He, a
liberal colleague, told me bluntly that I was "sub par," that my per
formance was "unacceptable. "93 What most disturbed me was that
he appeared to swagger unsympathetically in his seat. I felt
threatened, unsupported, and disrespected. 94 As he spouted on ar
92. See Delgado, supra note 52.
The principle [of formal equality] also reinforces white superiority. Under it,
non-whites are judged with scrupulous fairness by criteria coined by, normed
on, and applied by whites. Not surprisingly, the latter generally come out
ahead; yet because all have had an equal chance, each person's lot must be
roughly what he or she deserves.
Id. at 633.
93. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
What is truly demeaning in this era of double-speak-no-evi! is going on inter
views and not getting hired because someone doesn't think we'll be comforta
ble. It is demeaning not to be promoted because we're judged "too weak,"
then putting in a lot of energy the next time and getting fired because we're
"too strong." . .. It is outrageously demeaning that none of this can be called
racism, even if it happens to disproportionately large numbers of black people;
as long as it's done with a smile, a handshake and a shrug; as long as the
phantom-word "race" is never used.
Id. at 2141.
94. Apparently I am not alone in having this experience. Okianer Dark writes:
Near the end of my first year of teaching, the Dean called me into his
office to provide me with an assessment of my teaching during that year. Af
ter some preliminary matters were discussed, he told me that I was one of the
worst teachers in the law school. He said that there were three poor law
teachers in the law school and I fit in that category. I asked him to tell me
what was wrong with my teaching and how I might improve. His response was
that he was not certain that I could improve and that I would have to learn
how to work within my limitations in this area.
Dark, supra note 27, at 32.
In my first year of law teaching, I also met with my dean. In our conversation
about my teaching abilities, he told me that I would never be as good as a senior col
league who had been teaching Real Property for more than 20 years. He told me of this

176

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:151

rogantly and officiously, I looked at the junior female colleague
(the same one who told the student to report to the Personnel Com
mittee); I needed a reality check. I wanted some assurance that I
was not misreading him. I also tried to see if she agreed with his
outrageous conduct. As I looked at her, she turned her eyes away.
I was stunned. If I told him how I really felt, I would lose any sup
port he might have to offer. If I sat quietly, he could get the wrong
impression about me, my personality, and my pedagogical goals.
After dressing me down and impliedly threatening my future at the
law school, he offered me the wisdom of his years of teaching. He
told how he had the same problems at the law school where he first
taught, and how marketing his course helped him. This raises a
question in my mind: How do I market my course when my race
and perspectives are the central issues?95 In the end, he acknowl
edged but never addressed my class's racial dynamics.
N ext, he "suggested" that I change my textbook; it was, after
all, controversial. I got what he was implying: my textbook offends
ordinarily civilized students and irks them into racist, violent rages.
If I could use a standard textbook, it would all go away. I mustered
as much confidence as I could, and I stated in what I hoped was not
a challenging tone that I had invested too much time in learning the
book. I needed time to master it. What I really wanted to say was:
"How dare you challenge my right to choose a textbook that closely
supported my pedagogical goals and philosophy." He nodded po
litely; she sat quietly. If I had agreed to change my textbook, which
no other property professor in this institution used, I believe I
would have been encouraged to use Jesse Dukeminier and James
Krier's textbook. 96 Unlike Chused's textbook,97 this textbook has
been widely adopted, and a commercial outline exists for it. With
this textbook, my colleagues would not have to read my textbook in
order to assist me in achieving my pedagogical goals, and in theory
colleague's wit, command of the subject, and his control in the class. He never dis
cussed the obvious: he was white, had taught for more than 20 years, and should know
his subject. At that point, I sensed that this senior colleague was the standard bearer. I
had fallen decidedly short of his quality, and by my dean's estimation, I could never
catch up-not even get close. I sat in the chair across from him not knowing exactly
what to say. I did realize that if I tried to teach like him, I would forever chase a
chimera, and if I ever caught it, nothing there would be of substance. I realized that I
would never be viewed as a good law teacher.
95. See Dark, supra note 27, at 31 ("[Ble careful and deliberate before acting on
... advice. Just because it worked for 'them' does not automatically mean it will work
for you. ").
96. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993).
97. See CHUSED, supra note 33.
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they could better understand what I was doing. At the very least,
race, gender, and class would have been consigned to note
problems, and note problems can always be ignored because they
are not key to learning the legal doctrine (Le.,"black letter law").
In this meeting, I felt too frightened, too isolated. If this liberal
white male did not understand, and if this junior female colleague
noticed what was happening but felt powerless to question his un
mitigated arrogance, I certainly as a new assistant professor should
not worsen my situation. And as a doubtful black intellectual, I had
no standing to question openly the manner in which he challenged
my judgment in teaching from this textbook. 98
In the Fall of 1992, my white colleagues questioned my status
as a black intellectual. As usual, my students complained because I
used legal philosophy (without Kant) and cases to discuss property
law as a cultural institution.99 Because my senior property profes
sor began with landlord-tenant law and because I already had a rep
utation, my students felt that they would be particularly prejudiced
when they were to take the bar examination almost three years
later. As usual, these complaints passed through the dean's hand
(i.e., a Personnel Committee member ex officio) into the Personnel
Committee's jurisdiction. After notice, the Personnel Committee
members visited my class; the visits continued for three weeks.
Prior to the visits, I was never asked by a Committee member if he
or she could meet with me to discuss any of at least three vital is
sues: first, what my teaching philosophy was, second, what I in
tended to cover on a given day, and third, if I could make materials
available to my visitors. This last point is vital because none of the
property professors served on the Committee. Equally important,
after a visit, the Personnel Committee never came to talk with me
about what it had heard, understood, or believed. Without this pro
fessional courtesy, the Personnel Committee would have to rely on
others who taught property law to assess my substantive command
of my material. Without feedback, I could not learn constructively
and consistently how I could affect my pedagogical goals.
On the occasion of visiting my class, the Personnel Committee
98. Cf Russell, supra note 6, at 261 ("Most [whites] consciously have to remind
themselves that she is their equal. Otherwise, the tendency is to assume her inferiority,
to believe that her appointment was unmerited, and was thus nothing more than a grant
of their grace.").
99. See, e.g., International News Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc.
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
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listened to "Socratic" dialogue with my students about contingent
remainders and executory limitations. We had been discussing fu
ture interests for only a few classes. As part of their assignment,
they were required to read Jesse Dukeminier's Contingent Remain- .
ders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction. lOo
Dukeminier argues that apart from destructibility and the Rule in
Shelley's Case, which courts refuse to apply, "no discernible differ
ence [exists] between executory interests and contingent remain
ders. "101 A student asked me as I proceeded to question, "Are
these interests just alike?" I responded by saying, "Technically,
they are not, and they developed at different historical moments.
You've obviously read the article. I agree with Dukeminier; these
interests are functionally equivalent." My students did not react
with distinct concern, perhaps because they had read the article and
understood or perhaps because they had read the article and re
mained as confused as ever. At class's end, I went over the dia
grams on the board, answering my students' concerns and offering
additional information and examples. I did not approach my visi
tors, and they did not offer me any words of concern or
encouragement.
In November of 1992, I met with my subcommittee. The mem
bers were different, but the effect was the same. Although I was
stronger emotionally, I was totally shocked when the chairperson of
the Personnel Committee stated with cruel certainty, "You made a
mistake in your class." In truth, I was not shocked that I would
make a mistake. Teachers make mistakes! My face registered
shock because I was told that the visitors from the Personnel Com
mittee disagreed with my agreement with Jesse Dukeminier's arti
cle, and they went to the library to research my agreement against
what they had learned in law school. I could not believe what I was
hearing. First, I declared that I had not made a mistake; I felt al
most defiant. Then I asked pointedly, "Why didn't anyone come to
talk to me?" I also asked, "Why wouldn't someone come and tell
me that I've made a mistake so that, if true, I could immediately
correct it; minimize the harm?" I was on the defensive again. At
that point I began to explain to them that I had relied upon sources
such as my textbook and treatises. When it became clear that I was
probably not mistaken, I was told that perhaps I was teaching over
100. J.J. Dukeminier, Jr., Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A Re
quiem for the Distinction, 43 MINN. L. REV. 13 (1958).
101. Id. at 52.
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my students' heads. I thought to myself, "My students were not
accusing me."
I realized then what my colleagues were implicitly saying.
They could not imagine me as an intellectual, someone who thinks
and disagrees with legal doctrine. I was supposed not to challenge
doctrine critically but to impart rules, principles, and standards sim
ply and clearly. I felt they were also stating that I was an ineffective
intellectual. Basically, without any work, they should have under
stood what I was doing that day in class. Why read my book? If I
am effective, anyone should walk in off the street and get it. If they
cannot, then I must be teaching over my students' heads. As we
talked, I told them that if my students had problems with the mate
rial, I expected them to read a treatise or a law review article, and
then come to me. I was then told emphatically that my students
must get everything they need in class. Again the point: I am not a
"black intellectual" but a conveyor of legal doctrine (i.e., black let
ter law).1 02
At this same meeting, the chair "suggested" that I not teach
Dred Scott. I gently resisted. This suggestion reflects the following
student criticism: "Get a new textbook. This book has so much
background material and it is so confusing that it is a detriment to
understanding the substance. Very often the background material
is completely irrelevant to the opinions. Cut back on the historical
cases." By reading a case's historical background, a student can get
a much better sense that the court is not simply applying rules in a
very mechanical fashion. Rather, the court functions within its his
torical context, and this context influences how the court resolves a
legal dispute. Thus, I need not defend my choice. What is most
vital is that historical cases and their background material focus on
race, gender, and class issues. In the American Land History chap
ter, we find Native American issues,103 racial discrimination,l04 and
gender oppression. lo5 If students did not directly advocate drop
ping the historical material (perhaps, proxies for race?), they explic
itly stated that "civil rights" and "constitutional law" were
102. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 35 ("Dominant beliefs in the objectivity of
legal discourse serve to suppress the conflict [of individual values, experiences, and
world views] by discounting the relevance of any particular perspective in legal analysis
and by positing an analytical stance that has no specific cultural, political, or class
characteristics. ").
103. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
104. See, e.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
105. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
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irrelevant to Real Property. If I were to drop the historical mate
rial, I would be agreeing that a race, gender, class, or sexual orienta
tion perspective was irrelevant. Basically, then, I would use a non
perspective perspective that would reinforce that I, a "black" intel
lectual,was irrelevant.1°6 That is, my views did not matter to the
law's meat and potatoes-legal doctrine. In this way, by agreeing
not to teach decisions like Dred Scott, I must first agree that my
perspective and my intellectual inquiry were immaterial to the truly
relevant skill of analyzing legal rules.
After that meeting with the subcommittee, I was deeply con
cerned. At this institution, I could not be an intellectual. Rather, I
must spout rules, all the while showing my students how to parse
them and digest them analytically. A private conversation I later
had with a member of the Personnel Committee confirmed this
feeling. He voluntarily came to me and said that the "powers that
be" believed that I had turned the corner on my teaching. I was
happy to hear this modest praise. I could use a respite from the
institutional pressure. However, he then asked me to do two things:
stop writing and teach like everyone else. I was floored, but I could
have overreacted. Perhaps, like an angel of mercy, he came to offer
me solace in the bosom of the institutional gods (e.g., the dean). If
I would simply capitulate, all would be forgiven. The "bastard"
child might ultimately be adopted into this institutional family (i.e.,
tenure); I should thus be very grateful. On the other hand, he
might have different motives. During this conversation, he ex
plained to me that I did not have to write any more. I had two
articles published in my first two years of teaching. At this institu
tion, tenure required only two articles. Thus, I could devote my
time to teaching. As for teaching, I guess he wanted me to blend. I
told him that I could not teach like others. I did not know what he
meant. Besides, if I could not use my own pedagogical approach,
then this institution simply wanted not my experience, but my black
face. (The ABA Accreditation Team visited this institution during
106. Cf Crenshaw, supra note 42, at 35-36:
To assume the air of perspectivelessness that is expected in the classroom, mi
nority students must participate in the discussion as though they were not Af
rican-American or Latino, but colorless legal analysts. The consequence of
adopting this colorless mode is that when the discussion involves racial minori
ties, minority students are expected to stand apart from their history, their
identity, and sometimes their own immediate circumstances and discuss issues
without making reference to the reality that the "they" or "them" being dis
cussed is from their perspective "we" or "us."
Id. (footnote omitted).
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my first year.) I was left to think about his words and their mean
ing. Within minutes, I called my mentors, and I was told emphati
cally that if I stopped writing, I would die professionally. I listened;
I kept writing, and I sent letters to my friends across the country
telling them that I had to leave and that I needed their help. Why?
In protecting this institution's narrative of good law teaching, I was
neither valued as a colleague, respected as a law professor, nor ac
cepted as a "black" intellectual.
CONCLUSION

In this personal essay, I operate with one principle: We must
begin to talk about how minorities, women, and gays/lesbians are
treated by majority white legal educational institutions. In this
vein, I offer my experiences. It took me years to get over the pain.
I first began by forgiving my so-called colleagues. I had to stop
hating the profoundly insecure white males who used boot camp
tactics to try to kill my spirit, to break my will to resist, or to drive
me from the profession. I also had to stop despising my white,
mostly liberal, male (and female) colleagues who did not have the
temerity to shield me from the injustices I suffered. In effect, they
were much more concerned about their economic circumstances
than my professional development and personal safety. I cannot
fault my students too much. After all, it took a high conspiracy of
faculty, deans, and students to assault me concertedly. I am not
suggesting that I did not make mistakes. Of course I did! I was
learning how to teach creatively, and I proceeded on the theory that
creative teaching is a process. If I never tried it, I might not ever
have learned to do it well. This institution's response was punish
ment. To be different, to raise nasty race-oriented issues, for exam
ple, is to invite professional death and spirit murder.107 My death
and murder were necessary because I continued to insert race, gen
der, and class where, in their minds, it did not belong. As a conse
quence, race-this offending, contaminating substance-operated
everywhere. The institution could not right itself until I had been
broken like a wild, brute beast or until I had been so marginalized,
silenced, and oppressed that I would voluntarily come in from the
psychological cold by becoming a team player, even at the expense
of my own pedagogy, my duty to my students, and my own intellec
tual goals.
107. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987).

